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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(g). This appeal is from a final 
order that disposes of all claims with respect to all parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did petitioner waive his Utah Constitutional rights by failing 
to specifically object to the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Utah 
Constitutional grounds at the trial court? 
2. Does the three-month statute of limitations contained in Utah 
Code § 78-12-31.1 violate petitioner's rights under the Utah 
Constitution Article I Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 2 6? 
3. Was the trial court correct in dismissing petitioner's habeas 
corpus petition for hearing dates prior to April 27, 1987? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These are issues of law requiring no deference to the trial 
court. This court reviews for correctness, "correctness of error" 
State v. Rhodes 818 P2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991), Smith v. Cook 
803 P2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990) (no deference). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 1, 
inherent and inalienable right to liberty 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 5, 
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
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Utah Constitution Article I Section 7, 
no deprivation of liberty without due process 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 11, 
every person shall have a remedy by due course of law 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 26, 
provisions are mandatory and prohibitory 
Utah Code § 78-12-31.1: Within three months: For relief 
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall 
apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
Utah Code § 78-12-36, amended April 27, 1987, 
disability of incarceration 
Garcia v. Jorqenson, 910298-CA, (unpublished memorandum 
decision May 18/92) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from Third District Judge Kenneth Rigtrup's 
February 28, 1992 ORDER OF DISMISSAL, 91 090 6525 HC, wherein 
Gibson's PETITION SEEKING EXTRAORDINARY WRIT of Habeas Corpus was 
dismissed based on the 3-month statute of limitations in Utah Code 
§§ 78-12-31.1 and 78-12-36 as amended April 27, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioner Alan Gibson is prisoner 12937. Foote v. Board of 
Pardons 808 P2d 734 (Utah 1991) appeared Mar 14/91. Gibson filed 
a Pro Se PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT seven months later on Oct 
16/91. Counsel for Gibson was appointed on Nov 25/91. An AMENDED 
PETITION was filed Jan 27/92 by appointed counsel. After a 
hearing on Feb 24/92, District Court Judge Kenneth Rigtrup issued 
an ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Feb 28/92 based on the three-month 
statute of limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1. At the hearing 
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petitioner's counsel did not specifically object to the ORDER on 
Utah Constitutional grounds. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The three month statute of limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-
31.1 violates petitioner's Utah Constitutional rights Article I 
Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26; and this denial is so basic that it 
amounts to plain error. Further, the ORDER OF DISMISSAL was 
overly broad in sweeping away petitioner's rights to habeas corpus 
review of Parol Board hearings that occurred prior to April 27, 
19871. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
1 Did petitioner waive his Utah Constitutional rights by failing 
to specifically object to the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Utah 
Constitutional grounds at the trial court? 
In Garcia v. Jorqenson, 910298-CA, (unpublished memorandum 
decision May 18/92) Garcia argued the 3-month statute of 
limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 was unconstitutional. But, 
as in this case, Garcia had not raised the constitutionality of 
the Utah Code at the trial court below. This court affirmed the 
trial court's dismissal of Garcia's petition for habeas corpus 
saying "It is well-settled that this court does not review 
constitutional issues for the first time on appeal absent plain 
error or exceptional circumstances." Id at 4, citing State v. 
Archambeau, 880 P2d 920, 923-25 (Utah App. 1991). What is not 
1
 The date §§ 78-12-31.1 and 78-12-3 6 were amended to limit 
habeas corpus relief to 3-months from the time petitioner 
knew or should have known of grounds for relief. 
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clear from the Garcia decision is whether plain error or 
exceptional circumstances were in fact raised at the appeal court 
by Garcia. 
Petitioner argues infra that the 3-month statute of 
limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional under 
the Utah Constitution Article I Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26, and 
that it is plain error for the trial court to dismiss Gibson's 
petition in violation of his constitutional rights. 
Petitioner further argues that raising the constitutionality 
of the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 at the trial 
court would not have been remedial since the trial court is 
obliged to follow the plain language of the statute. It is the 
statute itself that is wrong. 
2 Does the three-month statute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 violate Utah Constitution Article I 
Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26. 
2a Utah Constitution Article I Section 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property; ... protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances ... 
Application of this section to a liberty interest may be an 
issue of first impression. Case law focuses on how property 
interests are protected the same as life/liberty interests, 
however, the analysis used by the court in reviewing a protected 
property interest is persuasive for analysis of a liberty interest 
protected in the same section. 
In Block v. Schwartz 76 P. 22, 24-25 (Utah 1904) (fraudulent 
sale statute) the court said: 
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These constitutional provisions [Utah Constitution Article I 
Sections 1 and 7] constitute the supreme law of the 
commonwealth upon this subject. To that law the executive, 
the legislative, and the judicial departments of the 
government alike must bow obedience, as well as every subject. 
It forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and 
immunities of all citizens. Under its mandate no person can 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law, and every person is entitled to the equal protection 
of the laws, and may acquire property, posses and protect it, 
as well as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent 
and inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitutional 
guaranties. An enactment, therefore, which deprives a person 
arbitrarily of his property, or of some part of his personal 
liberty, is just as much inhibited by the supreme law as one 
which would deprive him of life. 
The court said in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 284 P2d 702, 
705 (Utah 1955) (anti-price advertising of eyeglasses statute) 
citing Backman v. Bateman 263 P2d 561, 563 (Utah 1953) (anti-
nepotism statute) see also Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County 
370 P2d 355, 356 (Utah 1962) (deceptive advertising): 
In judging the propriety of this enactment, we must take into 
consideration the balance between the alleged evil sought to 
be corrected and the limitation on constitutional rights the 
ordinance would impose. In reference to the use of the police 
power for such a purpose, this Court has said: "There must 
exist an evil of a substantial nature, the correction of which 
would serve the public welfare * * *." 
In this case petitioner's liberty interest protected by Utah 
Constitution Article I Section 1 is being unduly compromised by 
the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1. Petitioner, 
from his prison cell, without aid of counsel or access to a law 
library, is expected to file suit to protect rights that arose 
from the Foote decision within 3-months or lose them forever. This 
is not just. This is not constitutional. Application of this 
limit here is especially heinous because the evil the state is 
protecting the "public" from is complaint of abuse by the state 
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itself. The state, by legislative fiat, is using a statute of 
limitations as a form of immunity to protect itself from the 
fallout of the Foote decision. 
2b Utah Constitution Article I Section 5 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the 
public safety requires it. 
This writ cannot be abrogated or its efficiency curtailed by 
legislative action. Cases within the relief afforded by it 
cannot, until the people voluntarily surrender their right to 
this greatest of all writs by an amendment of the organic law, 
be placed beyond its reach and remedial action. The privilege 
of the writ cannot even be temporarily suspended, except for 
the safety of the state, except for rebellion or invasion.2 
More recently Justice Stewart said in Hurst v. Cook 777 P2d 
1029, 1033 (Utah 1989) (sexual abuse of a child): 
Historically, the Writ has played such a large role in the 
history of our law that it has received specific 
constitutional protection. The Declaration of Rights of the 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 5, expressly prohibits 
restrictions on the availability of the Writ except "when the 
public safety requires it. 
Judges Garff, Billings and Davidson in Hatch v. Deland 790 P2d 
49 (Utah App. 1990) (Per Curiam) found unconstitutional the 
state's attempt to immunize itself from the courts with Utah Code 
§ 77-27-5(3) (decisions of the Board of Pardons are final and are 
not subject to judicial review). The court reversed the trial 
court saying "The right to petition for habeas corpus based on 
violation of substantial constitutional rights is guaranteed by 
Utah Constitution.11 Id at 50. 
In re Dill 5 P. 39, 45 (Kansas 1884) quoting People v. 
Liscomb 60 N.Y. 559 
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Justice Zimmerman in Smith v. Cook 803 P2d 788, 796 (Utah 
1990) (probation revoked after probationary period expired) 
(concurring opinion) speaking specifically to § 78-12-31.1 said 
"I do not think the legislature can validly impose a three-month 
limitation period on habeas corpus actions." 
The language of article I, section 5 is clear, plain and 
unambiguous; it forbids suspension of the writ. When you add the 
weight of section 1 (inherent and inalienable rights) and section 
2 6 (mandatory and prohibitory) to section 5 it is hard to see how 
any statute of limitation on habeas corpus could satisfy the Utah 
Constitution. 
2c Utah Constitution Article I Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
This section empowers the court. In Condemarin v. University 
Hospital 775 P2d 348, 357 (Utah 1989) (statute imposing limits on 
amount person could claim against uninsured government entity) the 
court said: 
We are required to assess the reasonableness of the 
legislative expansion of government immunity contained in 
section 63-30-10 against the degree of intrusion on rights 
protects by the Utah Constitution. That is the essence of the 
requirement of due process under our constitution. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 7. 
What is the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 if 
not an expansion of government immunity? What is the state doing 
here except protecting itself from it's own bad acts? How can 
there be due process in so short a period of time? 
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2d Utah Constitution Article I Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a 
remedy by due course of law ... 
In Condemarin the court found provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code §§ 63-30, unconstitutional 
under article I section 11. The court conducted a "means-end 
review" to insure that "legislative action be rationally related 
to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose." The 
court said a rationality requirement was "the most minimal of 
constitutional limitations on legislative action." Id at 356. 
In Condemarin the court followed a two part test first 
articulated in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P2d 670, 680 
(Utah 1985) (statute of repose). First, does the law provide an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy? Second, if not then 
abrogation must be justified by "clear social or economic evil" 
and may not be an "arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective." Condemarin at 357-58, see also Avis v. Board of 
Review 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah App. 1992) (protection from 
stale claims is a legitimate legislative purpose for three year 
statute of limitation). 
Since petitioner's rights are being cut off, no alternative 
state remedy is available (first prong) therefore under Berry 
there must be a clear social or economic evil (second prong). 
Here the only evil is that the state might have to defend against 
inmate claims. Even if avoiding the cost of defense is a 
legitimate state purpose, a 3-month statute of limitations is 
arbitrary and unreasonable (second prong part two). It is 
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unreasonable to expect prisoners to be able to coordinate the 
necessary resources to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in so short a period of time. 
2e Utah Constitution Article I Section 26 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 
Similar to section 7, argued supra, this section empowers the 
court. In Berry at 67 6 the court said: 
Article I, section 2 6 rivets section 11, and all the other 
rights in the Declaration of Rights, into the fundamental law 
of the State and makes them enforceable in a court of law. 
Article I, section 2 6 declares that "the provisions of this 
constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise." 
3 Was the court correct in dismissing petitioner's habeas corpus 
petition for hearing dates prior to April 27, 1987, 
In Garcia this court quoted the compiler's notes to Utah Code 
§ 78-12-31.1 saying "the amendment to this section, deleting a 
reference to imprisonment as a disability, applies only to causes 
of action that arise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive 
application." Id at 4, (emphasis added). 
Gibson had six Board hearings3 prior to April 27, 1987. The 
trial court should not have dismissed Gibson's petition for those 
hearing dates. Gibson's right to petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus for those dates is protected by the pre-1987 Utah Code 
§ 78-12-3 6 (disability of incarceration) since the 1987 amendment 
has no retroactive affect, Smith v. Cook 803 at 790. 
3
 Jan 28/87, Feb 13/85, Mar 31/82, Apr 23/80, 
Dec 18/74, Jul 16/73 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
It was plain error for the trial court to dismiss Gibson's 
petition since the 3-month statue of limitations in Utah Code 
§ 78-12-31.1 violates Gibson's Utah Constitutional rights by 
restricting his rights to habeas corpus relief. 
Even if the tirial court were correct in dismissing Gibson's 
petition for review of his Parol Board hearings occurring after 
April 27, 1987, the trial court was in error for dismissing 
Gibson's petition for review of his Parol Board hearings occurring 
before April 27, 1987 since the change in the law was not 
retroactive. 
Gibson prays for release from confinement, for the trial court 
to hear his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for this court 
to rule that Utah code § 78-21-31.1 is unconstitutional. 
Mar 15/93 Mon 
by 
Michael L. Adkins, Esq 
for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF 
was delivered on Mar 15/93 Mon 
to Lorenzo K. Miller, Esq 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
330 South 3 00 East 
SLC Utah 84111 
575-1600 
by 
Michael L. Adkins, Esq 
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APPENDIX 
Garcia v. Jorqenson 910298-CA (Utah App. 1992) 
PILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Lee Garcia, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Lynn Jorgenson, Warden Young 
Adult Correction Facility; 
Gary W. Deland, Executive 
Director, Utah State 
Department of Corrections; 
Gerald Cook, Director of 
Institutional Operations, Utah 
State Department of 
Corrections; H.L. "Pete11 Haun, 
Chairman, Utah State Board of 
Pardons; William Peters, 
member, Utah State Board of 
Pardons; Don Blanchard, 
member, Utah State Board of 
Pardons, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
MAY181992 
*>Wm K Nconan 
OBJk<tf,the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910298-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 18, 1992) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Jay Fitt, Orem, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Lorenzo K. Miller, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Bench and Billings. 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
complaint for post-conviction relief. We affirm. 
On February 26, 199 0, petitioner was convicted of theft and 
sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
On February 26, 1990, the Utah Board of Pardons held a hearing to 
determine a possible parole date for petitioner. Only two board 
members were present and concluded plaintiff could receive a 
tentative parole date of May 25, 1993. The three member board 
later issued an order, on December 4, 1990, granting appellant a 
parole date of January 25, 1994. 
On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for post-
conviction relief, claiming the board of pardons violated his 
rights of due process and equal protection. The State filed a 
motion to dismiss claiming, among other things, that the 
complaint was barred by the statute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). On April 26, 1991, the court 
granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that the claim was 
time barred by operation of section 78-12-31.1. 
On appeal, petitioner claims the trial court erred in 
dismissing the complaint on the basis of the statute of 
limitations. First, he claims that section 78-12-31.1 does not 
apply because section 78-12-31.1 involves habeas corpus petitions 
and he filed a complaint for post-conviction relief. Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as it existed in March of 1991 
when the complaint was filed, provided that fl[s]pecial forms of 
pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus, mandamus . . . and other 
extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished.11 
Rule 65B(f) states that 
[appropriate relief by habeas corpus 
proceedings shall be granted whenever it 
appears to the proper court that any person 
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise 
restrained of his liberty. If the person 
seeking relief is imprisoned in the 
penitentiary and asserts that in the 
proceedings which resulted in his conviction 
there was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United State or 
under the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
or both, then the person seeking such relief 
shall proceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). 
In all other cases, proceedings under this 
subdivision shall be conducted in accordance 
with the following provisions . . . . 
Rule 65B(i), entitled "postconviction hearings,ff provides 
that 
any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
. . . under a commitment of any court, 
whether such imprisonment be under the 
original commitment or under a commitment for 
violation of probation or parole, who asserts 
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that in any proceeding which resulted in his 
commitment there was a substantial denial of 
his rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the State of Utah, or 
both, may institute a proceeding under this 
rule. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 65B(f) addresses all proceedings except claims 
regarding the proceedings resulting in the conviction. Rule 
65B(i), on the other hand, appears to address claims involving 
original commitment or a commitment due to a violation of 
probation or parole. The present case involves a claim regarding 
petitioner's parole hearing. Because the claim does not involve 
the proceedings resulting in the conviction, we conclude that 
65B(f)i applies and the complaint constitutes a habeas corpus 
"fTetTtibn. We therefore reject petitioner's claim that section %8-
12-31.1 does not apply because his pleading was not a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Petitioner also claims that even if section 78-12-31.1 
applies, the statute of limitations was tolled during his period 
of incarceration pursuant to Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 
1990). In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the State's 
claim that the three month statute of limitations contained in 
section 78-12-31.1 should not be tolled by the disability of 
incarceration provision in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1977). 
Section 78-12-3 6, before it was amended in 1987, provided that 
ff[i]f a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time 
the cause of action accrued either . . . imprisoned on a criminal 
charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal 
. . . the time of the disability is not part of the time limited 
for the commencement of an action." Appellant was imprisoned in 
1984 and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1988. 
In addressing appellee's claim that the disability of 
incarceration should not apply to habeas corpus actions, the 
court stated that appellee's claim was contrary to the clear 
language of section 78-12-3 6. The court further stated that "any 
ambiguity that may exist in sections 78-12-36 and 78-12-31.1 
should be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant." Smith, 
803 P.2d at 791. Therefore, the court held that the habeas 
corpus petition was not barred by section 78-12-31.1. 
As noted in Smith, section 78-12-31.1 was amended in 1987 
and now provides "[i]f a person entitled to bring an action, 
other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the 
cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of 
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
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commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992). 
The compiler's notes to section 78-12-3 6 suggest "that the 
amendment to this section, deleting a reference to imprisonment 
as a disability, applies only to causes of action that arise 
after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application!" 
Therefore, pursuant to Smith and in accordance with the 
compiler's notes, we conclude that those seeking habeas corpus 
relief must comply with the three month statute of limitations 
contained in section 78-12-31.1 unless their cause of action 
arose before April 27, 1987. 
In this case, appellant's cause of action arose in 1990 when 
the board of pardons issued its order. Therefore, section 78-12-
31.1 applies. Section 78-12-31.1 states: "[w]ithin three 
months: For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This 
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner 
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner." 
In this case, appellant complained of the board of pardons's 
December 4, 1990 order in his March 20, 1991 complaint for post 
conviction relief. Because the complaint was not filed within 
the three-month period, we find no error in the trial court's 
dismissal of the complaint on the basis that it was barred by 
section 78-12-31.1. 
Finally, petitioner claims section 78-12-31.l"is 
unconstitutional. It is well-settled that this court does not 
review constitutional issues for the first time on appeal absent 
plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Archambeau, 
880 P.2d 920, 923-25 (Utah App. 1991). The record contains no 
indication that petitioner raised the constitutionality of the 
statute below. We therefore decline to address the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus on the basis that it was barred by the 
statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-31.1. 
Orme, Judge 
f<^U^CC M M&^L 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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